1	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
2	DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
3	No. 1:13-cr-10164-WGY-ALL
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6	UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
7	
8	VS.
9	MICHAEL BOURQUE, et al
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13	*****
14	For Hearing Before:
15	Judge William G. Young
16	Motion to Suppress
17	
18	United States District Court District of Massachusetts (Boston)
19	One Courthouse Way Boston, Massachusetts 02210
20	Friday, February 14, 2014
21	* * * * * *
22	REPORTER: RICHARD H. ROMANOW, RPR
23	Official Court Reporter United States District Court
24	One Courthouse Way, Room 5510, Boston, MA 02210 bulldog@richromanow.com
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PROCEEDINGS
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                (Begins, 10:00 a.m.)
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                THE COURT: Good morning, counsel.
                MR. YOON: Good morning, your Honor.
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                THE COURT: Let's call the case.
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                THE CLERK: Now hearing Criminal Matter
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     13-10164, the United States of America versus Bourque,
8
     et al.
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                THE COURT: And just so we may have a complete
     record, can I ask you again to introduce yourselves,
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     we'll start with the government.
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                MR. YOON: Yes, your Honor. Michael Yoon for
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     the government.
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                MS. FELDMAN-RUMPLER: Good morning, your
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     Honor, Leslie Feldman-Rumpler for Michael Roy.
                MR. APFEL: Good morning, your Honor, David
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     Apfel, and with me is Robin Schwartz from my office, and
     Mark Newton is also present in court.
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                THE COURT: Okay.
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                MR. BARRON: Good morning, your Honor. Kevin
     Barron for David Akasa, who sits to my right.
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                THE COURT: Thank you.
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                MR. PALMER: John F. Palmer for Brian
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     Chisholm, um, waiving his presence, your Honor.
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                MR. PARKER: Peter Parker for Frank McGuire.
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Good morning, your Honor.
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                MR. KORMAN: Good morning, your Honor.
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     William Korman on behalf of Thomas Ehwa, who actually is
     here, he just stepped out in the hall. I'm sure he'll
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     be right back.
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                THE COURT: Thank you.
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                MR. McBRIDE: Good morning, your Honor. Devin
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     McBride on behalf of Raymond Panaggio, who is also
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     present.
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                MR. CONNOLLY: Good morning, your Honor.
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     Attorney Bill Connolly for Michael Bourque.
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                MR. McCORMICK: Good morning, your Honor,
     Edward McCormick John Kinney, who waives his presence
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     today.
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                MR. SCULLY: Good morning, your Honor, Liam
     Scully for Sean Cotter, who also waives his presence.
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                MR. SWOMLEY: Good morning, your Honor, John
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     Swomley for Robert Hagenaars, who's present.
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                MR. DEMISSIE: Good morning, your Honor,
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     Derege Demissie for Phillip Goolst, and he waives his
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     presence today.
                THE COURT: And, Mr. Demissie, the clerk
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     explains to me that you may have to leave, and
     Ms. Feldman-Rumpler will cover for you, and that's
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     fine. If you have to leave, just get up and leave.
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MR. DEMISSIE: Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.

Let me, um, simply to, I think, concentrate the argument, because what I'm going to take up first is the motion to suppress of Mark Newton in which various of the defendants join. I don't see this as a motion to suppress at all, rather it's a motion directed to the admissibility of evidence. And reading the papers -- and I have read the papers, it appears to me -- but my mind is open on anything that I may say now, but it appears to me the statute's been violated and the question is then what?

It doesn't appear that the statute has been violated in some sort of invidious cover-up fashion, rather it appears that the statute's been violated through inadvertence, inattentiveness to the statute's commands. So it is highly unlikely that the result would be suppression of what may well be otherwise extremely probative evidence. Instead the issue is a quite appropriate challenge to the admissibility of that evidence which places on the government the burden to turn their corners very square with respect to proving up that admissibility. They're going to have to take the, um, wiretap, the evidence of the wiretap, however it is collected, on disk or otherwise, and go from the

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street, if you will, into the courtroom proving up every step of the way.

Now, their proof, as far as the Court is concerned, need only be by a fair preponderance of the evidence because it's a preliminary finding of fact that allows the Court to make a ruling on the admissibility of evidence. So the question is when shall we do that? And it may be that the defense wants some sort of evidentiary hearing on that prior to the trial. I don't propose to grant that. Rather, in light of this challenge, the government's going to have to prove that up at trial. In most trials, that's not an issue. this trial, it may be. And so the government will have to prove it. I will make my preliminary finding and ruling, um, once they've had their chance to do that. Now, if that goes against the government, here's the problem the government faces because of my approach and their violation of the statute.

Let's say there is something -- I consider this highly unlikely, but possible, something invidious about this or let's say the government can't cover a step.

Well, if they can't cover a step, the result is clear, the evidence is inadmissible because we can't say that the data in court is reflective of what went on in the field, but we'll only know that after jeopardy has

attached, because I'm not doing this twice. The, um -- and that's the downside risk to the government.

The defense may well say, "Well, Judge, we're entitled to know whether you're going to admit this evidence," and there's merit to that. Only, I will tell you, I have read these materials and affidavits and the like and they are the typical proffer that is made in order to support the admissibility of evidence, and while the defense has every right, a confrontation clause right to challenge it at trial, if you press me now I'm inclined to rule that -- to find on the affidavits and rule that the evidence is admissible subject of course to what comes out at trial when we're actually looking at witnesses and everyone gets a chance to cross-examine them.

Now, there's other things we need to discuss and that is not a ruling, I'm eager indeed to hear argument, but I thought it would be helpful to explain to you what's in my mind when I come on the bench.

So, Mr. Apfel, I think you're the lead on this. Have I -- well, what about that analysis?

MR. APFEL: Well, I think you're wrong, your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay, I'll hear you.

MR. APFEL: Because for starters, the

government has a burden of proof to establish a -- that it complied with the statute, which clearly it didn't.

THE COURT: Well, I'm not now making rulings, but it looks like they didn't.

MR. APFEL: And then they have the burden to establish -- to come forward with a satisfactory explanation.

THE COURT: Correct.

MR. APFEL: Now, your Honor said that he read the "affidavits and the like". If there were affidavits, perhaps the analysis of your Honor would be correct, but we don't have any affidavits here, we have nothing except bald assertions by the government. We don't have any evidence, we don't have the necessary clear and convincing evidence that the integrity of the tapes have been maintained.

You know, your Honor said that it doesn't seem as if anything invidious here happened, there was anything -- you know, there was any attempt to corrupt the tapes, that the integrity of the tapes is probably intact.

That may well be the case, but we don't know, and that's because the government has come forward with nothing.

It's come forward with papers in which Mr. Yoon says he spoke to various and sundry agents, the very agents who, I would suggest, would have the inclination, certainly

the ability to tamper with the tapes because they were the ones who were in possession of the tapes and had access to them. The government said, "Oh, trust me, these are good agents, they're solid agents, and it was only five days in one case, five days in another case, seven days in another case, no big deal, take our word for it." Well, that's not good enough. And the statute

THE COURT: Of course it's not good enough in the sense that I'm not making any finding or ruling, I'm simply explaining to you when I propose to make it.

MR. APFEL: But it's a question of the issue of timing. There are two questions on timing. One, before the government can even get to trial, it has to at least make the preliminary necessary showing that there's a satisfactory explanation.

THE COURT: Well, an officer of the court files his brief, explains things, um, you think that bars a trial? What is the authority that I've got to embark on some evidentiary hearing here even if the statute was violated?

MR. APFEL: Because the statute itself -- the statute itself, the specific provision has embedded within it an exclusionary remedy, it's own specific exclusionary remedy specific to Section 2518(8)(a) and

Mora talks about that exclusionary remedy that is 1 embedded within that specific provision of that statute. 2 3 THE COURT: Well, respectfully, and I don't express any, um, disagreement with Mora, but I'm not 4 5 bound by Mora, am I? 6 MR. APFEL: Oh, you are bound by **Mora.** 7 time I checked, Mora is the controlling authority within 8 the First Circuit. 9 THE COURT: I stand corrected. You're right. MR. APFEL: Mora is consistent with the 10 11 Supreme Court's decision three years later in Ojeda 12 **Rios**, which really tracks **Mora** almost word for word. So I think you are bound by Mora and you're bound by the 13 14 statute and the statute requires, I think, that this be 15 addressed in the context of a motion to suppress and not 16 wait till jeopardy attaches. 17 THE COURT: Where's the authority for that? MR. APFEL: Um, I have to check. I have to 18 19 check. But I think that -- I think that typically --20 typically these issues with respect to exclusion of 21 evidence where there is an exclusionary rule, 22 particularly where there's a statutory exclusionary 23 rule, are handled by way of a motion to suppress. 24 THE COURT: Let's hear from Mr. Yoon.

Mr. Yoon, what do you think of the Court's

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analysis?

MR. YOON: Yes, sir. The government actually agrees with the Court's analysis and speaking to the risk of the jeopardy attaching, um, frankly the government's willing to take that risk should we proceed in this case.

THE COURT: Well, it's not bargaining, um, you're willing to take it, I'm telling you you're going to have to take it.

MR. YOON: Yes, absolutely, your Honor, and that's something that we're comfortable with and we don't think that's a disadvantage to the government given the way the investigation has gone.

THE COURT: Do you think you've satisfied the controlling cases, as I am reminded, and the statutory language by your brief?

MR. YOON: Your Honor, there was a violation here, absolutely. Should the tapes have been sealed before five days -- five days and seven days?

Absolutely. They should have been. This is an infraction of Title III, but not one that is substantive -- it is one that is technical in nature, your Honor, and one that does not trigger the suppression. That is the government's position.

THE COURT: Well, it doesn't trigger the

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suppression only because, um, I would be -- we're talking hypothetically here because I haven't ruled, satisfied with the explanation in your brief, right? MR. YOON: Yes, sir. THE COURT: Otherwise Mr. Apfel's correct, these tapes go nowhere because there has been a 7 statutory violation. MR. YOON: Yes, and but, as the Court has expressed and I think Mr. Apfel would agree, that there was no allegation of bad faith here and no invidious --THE COURT: Well, he doesn't know, he may want 12 to take a shot at at least putting some doubt in the jury's mind at the time of trial or in my mind in which 13 14 case, um, if it's sufficient, I will exclude them. MR. YOON: And that would be -- yes, that 16 would be the appropriate setting, where not necessarily 17 here, but at a trial or --THE COURT: What do you say to his last 19 argument that I must address this pretrial by way of a motion to suppress? MR. YOON: Your Honor, I don't believe that there is any authority for that. I believe that this is 22 23 an authenticity issue, um, that can be addressed during 24 the trial, the purported admissibility of the tapes. 25 The government can and will prove, will endeavor to

prove to the Court's satisfaction, before permitting to the jury, that in fact these tapes are exactly what they say, additional evidence -- um, additional methods by which we could do that -- also existing cooperators here. So, your Honor, we don't believe it's appropriate to address this in this setting, um, and we believe that it is more appropriate to have it in a setting where the trial has progressed.

THE COURT: Well, here's what I'm going to do. I'm going to deny the motion to suppress without prejudice to the following, without prejudice to further briefing on the issue of whether I must address this pretrial and without prejudice to, um, the burden on the government at trial to prove up the authenticity of the tapes. The defense need this motion, which I'm denying without prejudice, is sufficient to put the government on notice that there is a challenge to the authenticity of the tapes, especially as the government admits a statutory violation. And so the government will have the burden at trial to prove up the authenticity of the tapes.

Now, before we get to a final pretrial conference here --

MR. APFEL: Your Honor, may I interrupt for a second?

THE COURT: Yes, you may.

MR. APFEL: Before the ruling becomes set in stone.

Mora, my recollection, and I think this is correct, um, the procedural posture of Mora, were that the defendants pled guilty after a motion to suppress on precisely the grounds that had been advanced to the Court would raise and I think in that case rejected by Judge Garrity at the time.

THE COURT: I think that's right.

MR. APFEL: And I think that's right. And then they preserved -- they entered conditional pleas, conditioned on their right to appeal the issue of whether or not the statute had been violated.

So I don't know whether it is -- I can't say for certain, as I'm standing here, that it is a requirement that this issue be addressed pretrial in the context of the motion to suppress -- in the context of the motion to suppress. I believe, however, that that's what the statute calls for and that's what the practice is. I believe in almost every case --

THE COURT: No, but that's your point. I didn't mean to, um, sidestep your point, but my own preparation leads me to believe that the way I propose to ultimately address this is appropriate. So I'm

denying the motion to suppress, and I had two prongs, without prejudice.

One, I don't think you have a better argument than the one you've just articulated, but if you do and if I were to become persuaded I had to hold some evidentiary thing or at least, as you've reminded me, go further than Mr. Yoon's brief, then, if I become persuaded I must do that, I will do it. But as I sit here I am not persuaded, but I'm going to give you the chance, because that hasn't been briefed, the timing issue hasn't been briefed.

And the second point is -- and it's without prejudice really to save all the defendants' rights, I've told the government there's an admitted statutory violation, they've got to turn their corners very square as to authenticity at trial, I'll be looking at witnesses, they'll be cross-examination, at that time I will make my preliminary evidentiary findings, rulings, and everyone's rights will be saved if things were to go the government's way.

MR. APFEL: But, your Honor, one last point. The issue here is not simply authenticity, the issue here is not simply the integrity of the tapes, *Mora* makes this clear, *Ojeda Rios* makes it clear. Even if the government establishes beyond a shadow of a doubt

that the tapes, the integrity of the tapes have been maintained, they still must come forward with a satisfactory explanation for the delay. And if you put it off till trial, I haven't thought through the logistics, but it seems all but inevitable that we'd be in a burden-shifting area --

THE COURT: There's no burden shifting.

MR. APFEL: -- where the government has to prove not just that the integrity has been maintained, they have to go through all the other so-called "Mora factors" and establish good faith. Mr. Yoon said I haven't alleged bad faith. It's not my burden to allege bad faith.

THE COURT: I understand that.

MR. APFEL: The government has to establish good faith. You know, he has to establish that the delay was not so long that tampering could have taken place. And most importantly, for our purposes, he has to establish good reason and a satisfactory explanation, not mere excuses, for the cause for the delay. If we go forward to trial --

THE COURT: Well, I'm telling you that based upon his brief -- now maybe there's more to it than that, but based upon his brief, as he is an officer of the court, I think that he has provided satisfactory

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explanations. I'm content with that. I'm giving you every right to challenge it at trial and indeed to brief further why that challenge must be entertained prior to trial.

MR. APFEL: Can we go through -- can we go through even one of his so-called "satisfactory explanations" because for every one of the explanations there is specific case authority saying that it's not good enough, it's not an explanation, it's an excuse.

You know, his lead argument is that the appointment could not -- quote, on Page 8 of his brief, "could not be scheduled for the same day." He never tried. Even with the very partial showing that he's made, if you take the e-mails at face value and you read the e-mails, every one of these e-mails, um -- for the first one, the very first one, the Target Telephone Number 3 terminated on March 15th at 11:59. Mr. Yoon contacts the District Court clerk by e-mail on that same day, which is a Friday, and does he say, "Is the Court available? Can we do it now? Is the Court going to be available tomorrow after this is done? There's an immediacy requirement here. There's an urgency requirement." No. He says, "Could you let me know when we can schedule next week, can we schedule a time next week?" And that's what he does in each case.

Target Telephones 4 and 5, he contacts the clerk not the day that it goes down, but the next day and he says, "Can we set up a time next week?" He's contacting the Court in that case on a Friday morning and he says, "Can we do something next week?" Why not "Can we do something now? Can we do something this morning? Can we do something this afternoon? Can we do something over the weekend?" Nothing like that. Weekends count in the statute. "Immediately" means "immediately." And Mora, the District Court's opinion in Mora, makes it clear that weekends do count and have counted for over 25 years in this circuit. It's not a satisfactory explanation.

You know, Mr. Yoon says with respect to the last of the, um -- the reupping of Target Telephones 4 and 5, when those are terminated, he says, "Oh, we're very busy." There was a takedown of 15 different defendants. There were initial appearances. There were a lot of logistics. The government -- that's foreseeable, that's not out of the ordinary, that is the very stuff of a busy AUSA's workload. That's anticipated, it's not a reason for delay. You can find somebody else to cover. You can get a different District Court judge. The clerk not responding to e-mails is not a satisfactory explanation.

He's presenting all sorts of reasons as to why it was inconvenient for him to go to the Court and get these sealed, but he's not giving explanations that count as truly satisfactory explanations within the meaning of the case law. And that's his burden, and it's not his burden at trial, it's his burden now, and he hasn't met it.

THE COURT: Thank you. My ruling stands.

All right.

MR. PARKER: Your Honor, just so the record's clear, I want to make sure -- I haven't thought about this issue of suppression versus authenticity, but I want to object to that having this resolved prior to trial.

THE COURT: Oh, by joining in the motion, all of who have joined in the motion, have joined, I take it, in Mr. Apfel's arguments, which I have allowed for further briefing on. But that's my ruling.

MR. PARKER: So if I could just address one practical issue, Judge, with respect to that ruling? You know, if there's a doubt at all as to whether this evidence is going to come in and we're at trial, one or more of us is at trial, um, you know, I would move and I would suspect that I have grounds to exclude mentioning of these tapes in an opening by the government. And I

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think if we --
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                THE COURT: We'll face that at the time of the
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     trial.
                MR. PARKER: I think if we have the kind of
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     hearing we're all talking about having, that's not
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     something that's going to take place in the presence of
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     the jury, and so I guess for practical reasons, without
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     any legal authority behind them, I'm wondering why we
     don't take care of it with all of us here today.
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                THE COURT: I quess what I don't understand is
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     we have taken care of it, I've denied the motion to
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     suppress on this record. Your rights are saved.
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           All right. Now, with respect to Mr. Assencoa, who
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     represents Mr. Assencoa?
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                MR. PARKER: That's Assencoa, your Honor, and
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     it's James Budreau.
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                THE COURT: And he's not present. Well, he's
     got a motion to suppress that's going to take an
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     evidentiary hearing.
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                MR. YOON: Yes, Mr. Assencoa and Mr. Ouellette
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     both have motions that they've filed.
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                THE COURT: And neither counsel is present
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     joining in this?
                MR. YOON: I don't see them, your Honor.
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                THE COURT: All right. Well, the clerk is
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going to suggest a date. You inform them of the date. 1 We'll see if we can't -- and you be ready to prove it 2 up. Let me talk to the clerk a minute. 3 (Pause.) 4 5 THE COURT: How about Wednesday at 9:00 for 6 the government? 7 MR. YOON: Your Honor, the 19th? I am 8 scheduled to be out of town. THE COURT: How about Friday the 21st? 9 10 MR. YOON: The 21st? Thank you, your Honor. 11 That would be great. 12 THE COURT: At 9:00. You notify them that if they have a problem with that date, they can be in touch 13 with the Court. That's when we will handle that. 14 15 Now, let's move to the final pretrial conference 16 and, um -- so the short of it is, um, I guess in light 17 of what various defense counsel have advanced, I'm going to have to continue the trial. I propose to continue 18 19 the trial until the earliest available date in April. The clerk will announce the date. 20 (Pause.) 21 22 THE COURT: I propose to put the case to trial 23 on the 7th of April. Let me go through the concerns 24 that have been articulated that are in the Court's mind 25 -- well, we'll start with the government.

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The government's all right with the 7th of April?
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                MR. YOON: Yes, your Honor. Thank you.
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                THE COURT: And someone had a murder trial.
     Counsel?
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                MR. SWOMLEY: I have a murder trial for the
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     3rd, but I also have a murder trial for April 14th, so
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                THE COURT: I appreciate how busy you are,
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     we're going to start on the 7th, I'll deal with the
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     state judges, um, if we start.
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           Mr. Apfel had a personal matter, but the 7th's
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     okay for you?
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                MR. APFEL: The 7th should work. My only
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     concern is I have a trial scheduled with Judge Stearns
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     for the 14th.
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                THE COURT: But if I get you first, I'll work
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     with Judge Stearns.
           Mr. Parker, I was not insensitive to what you said
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     at the last time we met, but it seems to me that the 7th
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     ought to alleviate those concerns.
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                MR. PARKER: I can deal with that, your
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     Honor. I do have a motion before you for funds, there
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     were two, I got one ruled upon and one not, and the
     other one is kind of critical.
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                THE COURT: Yes, without -- I mean I properly
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treat these things ex parte and I think I can. The only reason I held that up, Mr. Parker, is -- there's no question about the request, but about the extent, and we're constantly -- we judges are constantly being hectored with limits now on what we can authorize and I have been inquiring within the executives, within the judiciary clerks and others, whether you didn't ask for too much.

So I'm certainly going to authorize it, but it may be -- and I will thank you for raising it, I will address it again. I remember seeing it and saying, "Is this over the amount?" and then the clerk's office steps have been criticized earlier today, we have looked into it and do not have an answer, for which I bear the responsibility. I'll address it again today.

MR. PARKER: Thank you.

THE COURT: All right. I'm putting it on for the 7th.

MR. APFEL: And I have an outstanding motion as well, your Honor.

THE COURT: If you do, I will check the docket, and I thank you. And if anyone else does, I'll go back over the whole docket.

All right. If we're going on the 7th, then, um -- the 7th of April, then by the 17th of March the

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government is to make a full disclosure of all the
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     materials required by the -- no, one week prior, by the
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     24th of March, the government is to make full disclosure
     of all the statements and materials that it is required
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     to disclose under the local rules. The -- by the 31st
     of March, the government is to set forth the materials
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     required to be set forth one week prior to the trial.
     By the 2nd of April, the defense is required to make a
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     reciprocal discovery. But the 4th of April, the, um --
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     motions in limine, stipulations and the like, are to be
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     filed. The case will empanel on the 7th of April.
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           Are there any other matters we should deal with
     this morning?
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                (Silence.)
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                THE COURT: I hear none.
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                MR. YOON: None from the government, your
17
     Honor.
                (Pause.)
18
19
                THE COURT: All right. I hear no other
20
     questions.
21
                MR. APFEL: Your Honor, one issue, just on the
     further briefing, on the timing question?
22
23
                THE COURT: Uh-huh.
24
                MR. APFEL: I don't think you set a schedule
25
     for that.
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THE COURT: I didn't so now it's -- here we
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     are in February and now it's off till, um -- this is the
 2
 3
     14th.
           How long would you like?
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                MR. APFEL: I think it's a discrete issue, so
     a week is fine.
 6
 7
                THE COURT: All right, by Friday the 21st.
8
     And I invite consideration beyond legal authorities,
     such as Mr. Parker raised, and we'll see what the
9
10
     government responds.
11
           And the government's response a week later by the
12
     28th.
13
                MR. YOON: Thank you, your Honor.
14
                THE COURT: And if I need any further
15
     hearings, I will schedule it.
16
                MR. YOON: Thank you, your Honor.
17
                MR. PARKER: Your Honor, one question?
                THE COURT: Yes.
18
19
                MR. PARKER: It's been a while since I geared
20
     up for trial in this building. I think that, um --
           Did you set the 24th as a 21-day disclosure
21
22
     requirement, because that would be the 17th? I think
23
     you were right the first time, if you had in mind the
24
     21st day --
25
                THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Parker. I should
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make it the 17th. The 21-day disclosure works back to the 17th. The government will understand that. All right? And then the government is to make further disclosure one week before and the defense is to make reciprocal disclosure by the Wednesday of the week before. All right. Thank you all. We'll recess. (Ends, 10:45 a.m.) CERTIFICATE I, RICHARD H. ROMANOW, OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER, do hereby certify that the foregoing record is a true and accurate transcription of my stenographic notes, before Judge William G. Young, on Friday, February 14, 2014, to the best of my skill and ability. /s/ Richard H. Romanow 03-19-14 RICHARD H. ROMANOW Date